GUNS, GERMS, AND STEEL THE FATES OF HUMAN SOCIETIES
枪炮、病菌与钢铁：人类社会的命运
Jared Diamond
［美］贾雷德·戴蒙德
译者：谢延光
PREFACE TO THE PAPERBACK EDITION
平装本序言
WHY IS WORLD HISTORY LIKE AN ONION
为什么世界历史像洋葱
THIS BOOK ATTEMPTS TO PROVIDE A SHORT HISTORY OF everybody for the last 13,000 years. The question motivating the book is: Why did history unfold differently on different continents? In case this question immediately makes you shudder at the thought that you are about to read a racist treatise, you aren't: as you will see, the answers to the question don't involve human racial differences at all. The book's emphasis is on the search for ultimate explanations, and on pushing back the chain of historical causation as far as possible.
这本书试图提供过去13000年每个人的简短历史。激发这本书的问题是：为什么历史在不同的大陆上展现得不同？如果这个问题一想到你将要读一篇种族主义论文就立即让你不寒而栗，那么你不是：正如你将看到的，这个问题的答案根本不涉及人类种族差异。这本书的重点是寻找最终的解释，并尽可能地推回历史因果关系的链条。
Most books that set out to recount world history concentrate on histories of literate Eurasian and North African societies. Native societies of other parts of the world—sub-Saharan Africa, the Americas, Island Southeast Asia, Australia, New Guinea, the Pacific Islands—receive only brief treatment, mainly as concerns what happened to them very late in their history, after they were discovered and subjugated by western Europeans. Even within Eurasia, much more space gets devoted to the history of western Eurasia than of China, India, Japan, tropical Southeast Asia, and other eastern Eurasian societies. History before the emergence of writing around 3,000 B.C. also receives brief treatment, although it constitutes 99.9% of the five-million-year history of the human species.
大多数描述世界历史的书籍都集中在有文化的欧亚和北非社会的历史上。世界其他地区的土著社会——撒哈拉以南非洲、美洲、东南亚岛屿、澳大利亚、新几内亚和太平洋岛屿——只接受了简短的对待，主要是关于他们在被西欧人发现并征服后，在其历史的晚期发生了什么。即使在欧亚大陆内部，用于研究欧亚大陆西部历史的空间也比中国、印度、日本、热带东南亚和其他欧亚大陆东部社会的空间要多得多。公元前3000年左右出现文字之前的历史也得到了简短的描述，尽管它占人类500万年历史的99.9%。
Such narrowly focused accounts of world history suffer from three disadvantages. First, increasing numbers of people today are, quite understandably, interested in other societies besides those of western Eurasia. After all, those “other” societies encompass most of the world's population and the vast majority of the world's ethnic, cultural, and linguistic groups. Some of them already are, and others are becoming, among the world's most powerful economies and political forces.
这种对世界历史的狭隘描述有三个缺点。首先，今天越来越多的人对欧亚西部以外的其他社会感兴趣，这是可以理解的。毕竟，这些“其他”社会涵盖了世界大部分人口和世界绝大多数族裔、文化和语言群体。其中一些国家已经跻身于世界上最强大的经济和政治力量之列，而另一些国家还在正在成为强大力量的路上。
Second, even for people specifically interested in the shaping of the modern world, a history limited to developments since the emergence of writing cannot provide deep understanding. It is not the case that societies on the different continents were comparable to each other until 3,000 B.C., whereupon western Eurasian societies suddenly developed writing and began for the first time to pull ahead in other respects as well. Instead, already by 3,000 B.C., there were Eurasian and North African societies not only with incipient writing but also with centralized state governments, cities, widespread use of metal tools and weapons, use of domesticated animals for transport and traction and mechanical power, and reliance on agriculture and domestic animals for food. Throughout most or all parts of other continents, none of those things existed at that time; some but not all of them emerged later in parts of the Native Americas and sub-Saharan Africa, but only over the course of the next five millennia; and none of them emerged in Aboriginal Australia. That should already warn us that the roots of western Eurasian dominance in the modern world lie in the preliterate past before 3,000 B.C. (By western Eurasian dominance, I mean the dominance of western Eurasian societies themselves and of the societies that they spawned on other continents.)
第二，即使对那些对现代世界的塑造特别感兴趣的人来说，一部自写作出现以来仅限于发展的历史也无法提供深刻的理解。直到公元前3000年，不同大陆上的社会才具有可比性，因此欧亚西部社会突然发展了文字，并首次在其他方面领先。相反，到了公元前3000年，欧亚和北非社会已经出现，不仅文字才刚刚出现，而且还出现了中央集权的国家政府、城市、广泛使用金属工具和武器、使用家养动物运输、牵引和机械动力，以及依靠农业和家畜作为食物。在其他大陆的大部分或所有地区，这些东西当时都不存在；它们中的一些(但不是全部)后来出现在美洲土著和撒哈拉以南非洲的部分地区，但只是在接下来的五千年中才出现；他们中没有一个是在澳大利亚土著人中出现的。这应该已经提醒我们，欧亚西部在现代世界的主导地位的根源在于公元前3000年之前的早期历史(所谓欧亚西部的主导地位，我指的是欧亚西部社会本身以及它们在其他大陆上产生的社会的主导地位)
Third, a history focused on western Eurasian societies completely bypasses the obvious big question. Why were those societies the ones that became disproportionately powerful and innovative? The usual answers to that question invoke proximate forces, such as the rise of capitalism, mercantilism, scientific inquiry, technology, and nasty germs that killed peoples of other continents when they came into contact with western Eurasians. But why did all those ingredients of conquest arise in western Eurasia, and arise elsewhere only to a lesser degree or not at all?
第三，关注欧亚西部社会的历史完全回避了这个显而易见的大问题。为什么这些社会变得异常强大和创新？对这一问题的通常回答会引发直接的力量，如资本主义的兴起、重商主义、科学研究、技术以及当其他大陆的人与欧亚西部人接触时杀死他们的有害细菌。但为什么所有这些征服要素都出现在欧亚大陆西部，而在其他地方出现的程度较低或根本没有？
All those ingredients are just proximate factors, not ultimate explanations. Why didn't capitalism flourish in Native Mexico, mercantilism in sub-Saharan Africa, scientific inquiry in China, advanced technology in Native North America, and nasty germs in Aboriginal Australia? If one responds by invoking idiosyncratic cultural factors—e.g., scientific inquiry supposedly stifled in China by Confucianism but stimulated in western Eurasia by Greek or Judaeo-Christian traditions—then one is continuing to ignore the need for ultimate explanations: why didn't traditions like Confucianism and the Judaeo-Christian ethic instead develop in western Eurasia and China, respectively? In addition, one is ignoring the fact that Confucian China was technologically more advanced than western Eurasia until about A.D. 1400.
所有这些因素都只是近因，而不是最终解释。为什么资本主义没有在墨西哥本土蓬勃发展，在撒哈拉以南非洲重商主义盛行，在中国进行科学研究，在北美本土发展先进技术，在澳大利亚本土发展肮脏的病菌？如果一个人通过援引特殊的文化因素来回应——例如，科学研究在中国被儒家思想扼杀，但在欧亚大陆西部受到希腊或犹太基督教传统的刺激，那幺他就继续忽视了最终解释的必要性：为什么像儒家思想和犹太基督教伦理这样的传统没有在欧亚大陆和中国西部分别地发展，此外，人们忽视了一个事实，即直到公元1400年左右，儒家中国在技术上比欧亚西部更先进。
It is impossible to understand even just western Eurasian societies themselves, if one focuses on them. The interesting questions concern the distinctions between them and other societies. Answering those questions requires us to understand all those other societies as well, so that western Eurasian societies can be fitted into the broader context.
如果只关注欧亚西部社会本身，就不可能理解它们。有趣的问题涉及他们与其他社会之间的区别。回答这些问题需要我们也了解所有其他社会，以便欧亚西部社会能够融入更广泛的背景。
Some readers may feel that I am going to the opposite extreme from conventional histories, by devoting too little space to western Eurasia at the expense of other parts of the world. I would answer that some other parts of the world are very instructive, because they encompass so many societies and such diverse societies within a small geographical area. Other readers may find themselves agreeing with one reviewer of this book. With mildly critical tongue in cheek, the reviewer wrote that I seem to view world history as an onion, of which the modern world constitutes only the surface, and whose layers are to be peeled back in the search for historical understanding. Yes, world history is indeed such an onion! But that peeling back of the onion's layers is fascinating, challenging—and of overwhelming importance to us today, as we seek to grasp our past's lessons for our future.
一些读者可能会觉得我将走向传统历史的相反极端，因为我在欧亚西部投入的空间太少，而牺牲了世界其他地区。我想回答的是，世界上其他一些地方非常有启发性，因为它们在一个小的地理区域内涵盖了如此多的社会和如此多样化的社会。其他读者可能会发现自己同意这本书的一位评论员。这位评论员带着温和的批评口吻写道，我似乎把世界历史看作一个洋葱，现代世界只是洋葱的表面，在寻求历史理解的过程中，洋葱的层次将被剥去。是的，世界历史确实是一个洋葱！但洋葱层的剥落对今天的我们来说是迷人的、具有挑战性的和压倒性的重要性，因为我们试图为未来吸取过去的教训。
J.D.
J.D
PROLOGUE
前言
YALI'S QUESTION
耶利的问题
WE ALL KNOW THAT HISTORY HAS PROCEEDED VERY DIFFERENTLY for peoples from different parts of the globe. In the 13,000 years since the end of the last Ice Age, some parts of the world developed literate industrial societies with metal tools, other parts developed only nonliterate farming societies, and still others retained societies of hunter-gatherers with stone tools. Those historical inequalities have cast long shadows on the modern world, because the literate societies with metal tools have conquered or exterminated the other societies. While those differences constitute the most basic fact of world history, the reasons for them remain uncertain and controversial. This puzzling question of their origins was posed to me 25 years ago in a simple, personal form.
我们都知道，对于世界上不同地区的各个民族来说，历史的发展进程是很不相同的。在上一次冰期结束后的13000年间，世界上的某些地区发展成为使用金属工具的、有文字的工业社会，另一些地区仅仅发展成为没有文字的农业社会，还有一些地区则仍然保留着使用石器的狩猎采集社会。这种历史上的差异对现代世界投上了持久的阴影，因为使用金属工具的、有文字的社会征服了或消灭了其他类型的社会。虽然这些差异构成了世界史的最基本的事实，但产生这些差异的原因始终是不确定的和有争议的。关于这些差异的由来这个令人困惑的问题，是在25年前以一种简单的个人形式向我提出来的。
In July 1972 I was walking along a beach on the tropical island of New Guinea, where as a biologist I study bird evolution. I had already heard about a remarkable local politician named Yali, who was touring the district then. By chance, Yali and I were walking in the same direction on that day, and he overtook me. We walked together for an hour, talking during the whole time.
1972年7月，我在新几内亚这个热带岛屿的沙滩上散步，当时我正在那里研究鸟类的演化。在这之前我已听说过有一个叫做耶利的当地知名政治家，这时候他正在这个地区旅游。那一天，耶利和我碰巧沿同一个方向散步，而且他追上了我。我们在一起走了一个小时，始终在交谈着。
Yali radiated charisma and energy. His eyes flashed in a mesmerizing way. He talked confidently about himself, but he also asked lots of probing questions and listened intently. Our conversation began with a subject then on every New Guinean's mind—the rapid pace of political developments. Papua New Guinea, as Yali's nation is now called, was at that time still administered by Australia as a mandate of the United Nations, but independence was in the air. Yali explained to me his role in getting local people to prepare for self-government.
耶利身上焕发着领袖的气质和活力。他的眼睛闪耀着迷人的光芒。他充满自信地谈论自己，但他也问了许多尖锐的问题，并且全神贯注地听我说话。我们的谈话从当时每个新几内亚人都关心的问题，即政治事态的迅速发展开始。耶利的国家现在叫做巴布亚新几内亚，那时仍然是联合国的一块托管地，由澳大利亚管理，但独立已是迟早的事。耶利对我说，他的任务就是使本地人作好自治的准备。
After a while, Yali turned the conversation and began to quiz me. He had never been outside New Guinea and had not been educated beyond high school, but his curiosity was insatiable. First, he wanted to know about my work on New Guinea birds (including how much I got paid for it). I explained to him how different groups of birds had colonized New Guinea over the course of millions of years. He then asked how the ancestors of his own people had reached New Guinea over the last tens of thousands of years, and how white Europeans had colonized New Guinea within the last 200 years.
过了一会，耶利话锋一转，开始考问起我来。他从来没有去过新几内亚以外的地方，他的最高学历是中学，但他却有着一种无法满足的好奇心。首先，他想要了解我对新几内亚鸟类的研究工作(包括我做这工作拿多少报酬)。我就告诉他，在几百万年的过程中，不同种群的鸟是如何移居新几内亚的。接着，他又问我，在过去的几万年中，他的人民的祖先是怎样到达新几内亚的，以及在过去200年中，欧洲的白人是如何开拓新几内亚的。
The conversation remained friendly, even though the tension between the two societies that Yali and I represented was familiar to both of us. Two centuries ago, all New Guineans were still “living in the Stone Age.” That is, they still used stone tools similar to those superseded in Europe by metal tools thousands of years ago, and they dwelt in villages not organized under any centralized political authority. Whites had arrived, imposed centralized government, and brought material goods whose value New Guineans instantly recognized, ranging from steel axes, matches, and medicines to clothing, soft drinks, and umbrellas. In New Guinea all these goods were referred to collectively as “cargo.”
谈话始终是友好的，虽然我们俩都了解耶利和我所代表的两个社会之间的关系是紧张的。两个世纪前，所有的新几内亚人仍然“生活在石器时代”。就是说，他们仍然使用着几千年前即已在欧洲为金属工具所取代的类似的石器，而他们所居住的也不是在集中统一的政治权威下组织起来的村庄。白人来了，他们建立了中央集权的政府，带来了各种物资，从钢斧、火柴和药品到服装、软饮料和雨伞，应有尽有，而新几内亚人立刻认识到这些东西的价值。在新几内亚，所有这些物品被一概称之为“货物”。
Many of the white colonialists openly despised New Guineans as “primitive.” Even the least able of New Guinea's white “masters,” as they were still called in 1972, enjoyed a far higher standard of living than New Guineans, higher even than charismatic politicians like Yali. Yet Yali had quizzed lots of whites as he was then quizzing me, and I had quizzed lots of New Guineans. He and I both knew perfectly well that New Guineans are on the average at least as smart as Europeans. All those things must have been on Yali's mind when, with yet another penetrating glance of his flashing eyes, he asked me, “Why is it that you white people developed so much cargo and brought it to New Guinea, but we black people had little cargo of our own?”
许多白人移民公开蔑视新几内亚人，说他们是“原始人”。在新几内亚人的白人“主子”(他们直到1972年还被这样称呼)中，甚至是最无能的人，他们的生活水准也远远高于新几内亚人，甚至高于像耶利这样的极有性格魅力的政治家。然而，耶利就像当时考问我那样考问过许多白人，而我也曾考问过许多新几内亚人。他和我都十分清楚地知道，新几内亚人通常至少和欧洲人一样聪明。耶利想必考虑过所有这些问题，因为他又一次用他那炯炯有神的眼睛洞察一切似地瞥了我一眼，问我道，“为什么你们白人制造了那么多的货物并将它运到新几内亚来，而我们黑人却几乎没有属于我们自己的货物呢？”
It was a simple question that went to the heart of life as Yali experienced it. Yes, there still is a huge difference between the lifestyle of the average New Guinean and that of the average European or American. Comparable differences separate the lifestyles of other peoples of the world as well. Those huge disparities must have potent causes that one might think would be obvious.
正像耶利所体会的那样，这是一个虽然简单但却切中要害的问题。是的，在普通新几内亚人的生活方式和普通欧洲人或美国人的生活方式之间仍然存在着巨大的差异。类似的差异同样把世界上其他民族的生活方式区别了开来。这些巨大的差异必定具有人们可能认为显而易见的重要原因。
Yet Yali's apparently simple question is a difficult one to answer. I didn't have an answer then. Professional historians still disagree about the solution; most are no longer even asking the question. In the years since Yali and I had that conversation, I have studied and written about other aspects of human evolution, history, and language. This book, written twenty-five years later, attempts to answer Yali.
然而，耶利的看似简单的问题，却是一个难以回答的问题。我当时就回答不出来。关于这个问题的解决办法，专业的历史学家们仍然意见不一：大多数人甚至不再问这样的问题了。在耶利和我进行那次谈话后的许多年里，我研究并用文字说明了关于人类进化、历史和语言的其他方面的问题。在25年后撰写的这本书就是试图对耶利的问题作出回答。
ALTHOUGH YALI'S QUESTION concerned only the contrasting lifestyles of New Guineans and of European whites, it can be extended to a larger set of contrasts within the modern world. Peoples of Eurasian origin, especially those still living in Europe and eastern Asia, plus those transplanted to North America, dominate the modern world in wealth and power. Other peoples, including most Africans, have thrown off European colonial domination but remain far behind in wealth and power. Still other peoples, such as the aboriginal inhabitants of Australia, the Americas, and southernmost Africa, are no longer even masters of their own lands but have been decimated, subjugated, and in some cases even exterminated by European colonialists.
虽然耶利的问题只涉及新几内亚人和欧洲白人的生活方式的差异，但它可以推而广之，联系到现代世界上更大规模的一系列悬殊差异。来自欧亚大陆的民族，尤其是仍然生活在欧洲和东亚的民族，以及移居到北美的民族，控制着世界的财富和权力。其他民族，包括大多数非洲人，已经摆脱了欧洲人的殖民统治，但在财富和权力方面仍然远远落在后面。还有一些民族，如澳大利亚、美洲以及非洲最南端的土著居民，甚至已不再是自己土地的主人，而是遭到欧洲殖民主义者大批杀害、征服，有时甚至被斩尽杀绝。
Thus, questions about inequality in the modern world can be reformulated as follows. Why did wealth and power become distributed as they now are, rather than in some other way? For instance, why weren't Native Americans, Africans, and Aboriginal Australians the ones who decimated, subjugated, or exterminated Europeans and Asians?
因此，关于现代世界的差异问题可以再次系统地阐述如下。为什么财富和权力的分配会是现在这个样子，而不是某种别的方式呢？例如，为什么不是印第安人、非洲人和澳大利亚土著杀害、征服或消灭欧洲人和亚洲人呢？
We can easily push this question back one step. As of the year A.D. 1500, when Europe's worldwide colonial expansion was just beginning, peoples on different continents already differed greatly in technology and political organization. Much of Europe, Asia, and North Africa was the site of metal-equipped states or empires, some of them on the threshold of industrialization. Two Native American peoples, the Aztecs and the Incas, ruled over empires with stone tools. Parts of sub-Saharan Africa were divided among small states or chiefdoms with iron tools. Most other peoples—including all those of Australia and New Guinea, many Pacific islands, much of the Americas, and small parts of sub-Saharan Africa—lived as farming tribes or even still as hunter-gatherer bands using stone tools.
对于这个问题，我们可以毫不费力地回顾一下历史。从公元1500年开始，当欧洲在全世界的殖民扩张刚刚兴起时，不同大陆上的民族业已在技术和政治组织方面存在着巨大的差异。欧洲、亚洲和北美洲的许多地区成了一些用金属装备起来的国家或帝国的基地，其中有些已经呈现工业化的端倪。两个印第安民族——阿兹特克人和印加人，统治着一些使用石器的帝国。撒哈拉沙漠以南的一些地区被划分为一些使用铁器的小国或由酋长管辖的部落。其他大多数民族——包括澳大利亚和新几内亚、许多太平洋岛屿、美洲的许多地区以及撒哈拉沙漠以南小部分地区的所有那些民族——都是一些农业部落，甚至仍然是一些使用石器的靠狩猎采集为生的族群。
Of course, those technological and political differences as of A.D. 1500 were the immediate cause of the modern world's inequalities. Empires with steel weapons were able to conquer or exterminate tribes with weapons of stone and wood. How, though, did the world get to be the way it was in A.D. 1500?
当然，从公元1500年开始的这种技术和政治上的差异，是现代世界不平等的直接原因。使用钢铁武器的帝国能够征服或消灭使用石制和木制武器的部落。然而，这个世界又是如何成了公元1500年时的那种模样呢？
Once again, we can easily push this question back one step further, by drawing on written histories and archaeological discoveries. Until the end of the last Ice Age, around 11,000 B.C., all peoples on all continents were still hunter-gatherers. Different rates of development on different continents, from 11,000 B.C. to A.D. 1500, were what led to the technological and political inequalities of A.D. 1500. While Aboriginal Australians and many Native Americans remained hunter-gatherers, most of Eurasia and much of the Americas and sub-Saharan Africa gradually developed agriculture, herding, metallurgy, and complex political organization. Parts of Eurasia, and one area of the Americas, independently developed writing as well. However, each of these new developments appeared earlier in Eurasia than elsewhere. For instance, the mass production of bronze tools, which was just beginning in the South American Andes in the centuries before A.D. 1500, was already established in parts of Eurasia over 4,000 years earlier. The stone technology of the Tasmanians, when first encountered by European explorers in A.D. 1642, was simpler than that prevalent in parts of Upper Paleolithic Europe tens of thousands of years earlier.
对于这个问题，我们可以根据历史记载和考古发现，再一次毫不费力地回顾一下更早的历史。直到大约公元前11000年上一次冰期结束时，各个大陆上的各个族群仍然都是靠狩猎采集为生的人。从公元前11000年到公元1500年，不同大陆的不同发展速度，成了导致公元1500年时技术和政治差异的原因。虽然澳大利亚土著和美洲印第安人仍然靠狩猎采集为生，但欧亚大陆的大部分地区、美洲和非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南的许多地区，已逐步地发展起农业、畜牧、冶金技术和复杂的政治组织。欧亚大陆的一些地区和美洲的一个地区，还独立地发明了文字。然而，这些新的发展中每一个发展，在欧亚大陆比在其他任何地方都出现得更早。例如，青铜器的大规模生产于公元1500年前的几个世纪在南美洲安第斯山脉一带还刚刚开始，而在4000多年前已经在欧亚大陆的一些地区开展起来。欧洲探险家是在公元1642年首次接触到塔斯马尼亚人的，那时他们的石器制作技术比几万年前欧洲旧石器时代晚期普遍使用的制作技术还要来得简单。
Thus, we can finally rephrase the question about the modern world's inequalities as follows: why did human development proceed at such different rates on different continents? Those disparate rates constitute history's broadest pattern and my book's subject.
这样，我们最后就能用别的措辞把现代世界的差异重新表述如下：为什么在不同的大陆上人类以如此不同的速度发展呢？这种速度上的差异就构成了历史的最广泛的模式，也是我这本书的主题。
While this book is thus ultimately about history and prehistory, its subject is not of just academic interest but also of overwhelming practical and political importance. The history of interactions among disparate peoples is what shaped the modern world through conquest, epidemics, and genocide. Those collisions created reverberations that have still not died down after many centuries, and that are actively continuing in some of the world's most troubled areas today.
虽然这本书归根到底是要讨论历史和史前史问题，但其主题不光是具有学术性，而且在实践上和政治上也是具有压倒一切的重要性的。不同民族之间相互作用的历史，就是通过征服、流行病和灭绝种族的大屠杀来形成现代世界的。这些冲突产生了回响，而这些回响在经过许多世纪后仍然没有消失，并且在今天世界上的某些最混乱的地区仍在活跃地继续。
For example, much of Africa is still struggling with its legacies from recent colonialism. In other regions—including much of Central America, Mexico, Peru, New Caledonia, the former Soviet Union, and parts of Indonesia—civil unrest or guerrilla warfare pits still-numerous indigenous populations against governments dominated by descendants of invading conquerors. Many other indigenous populations—such as native Hawaiians, Aboriginal Australians, native Siberians, and Indians in the United States, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Chile—became so reduced in numbers by genocide and disease that they are now greatly outnumbered by the descendants of invaders. Although thus incapable of mounting a civil war, they are nevertheless increasingly asserting their rights.
例如，非洲的广大地区仍在与近代殖民主义留给它的余孽进行斗争。在其他地区——包括中美洲、墨西哥、秘鲁、新喀里多尼亚和前苏联的许多地区，以及印度尼西亚的一些地区——社会动荡或游击战争，使甚至更多的本地居民起来反对由外来征服者的后代所控制的政府。其他的许多本地居民——如夏威夷的本地人、澳大利亚土著、西伯利亚本地人，以及美国、加拿大、巴西、阿根廷和智利的印第安人——由于灭绝种族的大屠杀和疾病，他们的人数已经锐减，现在在人数上已被入侵者的后代大大超过了。虽然他们因此而不能发动内战，但他们仍然日益坚持维护自己的权利。
In addition to these current political and economic reverberations of past collisions among peoples, there are current linguistic reverberations—especially the impending disappearance of most of the modern world's 6,000 surviving languages, becoming replaced by English, Chinese, Russian, and a few other languages whose numbers of speakers have increased enormously in recent centuries. All these problems of the modern world result from the different historical trajectories implicit in Yali's question.
除了各民族之间由于过去的冲突而引发的当前这些政治和经济反响外，当前还存在着语言方面的反响——尤其是现代世界上现存的6000种语言中的大多数语言即将消亡，而由英语、汉语、俄语和近几个世纪以来使用人数大大增加的其他几种语言所取代。现代世界的所有这些问题，都是由于耶利问题中所暗含的不同历史轨迹造成的。
BEFORE SEEKING ANSWERS to Yali's question, we should pause to consider some objections to discussing it at all. Some people take offense at the mere posing of the question, for several reasons.
在为耶利的问题寻找答案之前，我们应该先停下来考虑一下根本就反对讨论这个问题的某些意见。有些人见到别人仅仅提出这个问题就会生气，这有几方面的原因。
One objection goes as follows. If we succeed in explaining how some people came to dominate other people, may this not seem to justify the domination? Doesn't it seem to say that the outcome was inevitable, and that it would therefore be futile to try to change the outcome today? This objection rests on a common tendency to confuse an explanation of causes with a justification or acceptance of results. What use one makes of a historical explanation is a question separate from the explanation itself. Understanding is more often used to try to alter an outcome than to repeat or perpetuate it. That's why psychologists try to understand the minds of murderers and rapists, why social historians try to understand genocide, and why physicians try to understand the causes of human disease. Those investigators do not seek to justify murder, rape, genocide, and illness. Instead, they seek to use their understanding of a chain of causes to interrupt the chain.
一种反对意见如下。如果我们成功地说明了某个民族怎么会统治另一民族的，那么这会不会就是为这种统治辩护呢？这会不会就是说这种结果是无可避免的，因此在今天试图改变这种结果可能是徒劳无益的呢？这种反对意见的根据是一种把对原因的说明同为结果辩护或承认结果混为一谈的普遍倾向。怎样利用历史的阐述是一个和阐述本身完全不同的问题。为了努力改变某个结果，了解是比再现或保持这种结果更经常使用的方法。这就是为什么心理学家要努力去了解杀人犯和强奸犯的心理，为什么社会历史学家要努力去了解灭绝种族的大屠杀，为什么精神病学家要努力去了解人类疾病的起因。这些人之所以去调查研究，并不是想要为谋杀、强奸、灭绝种族的大屠杀以及疾病进行辩护。相反，他们是想要利用他们对因果链的了解来打断这个锁链。
Second, doesn't addressing Yali's question automatically involve a Eurocentric approach to history, a glorification of western Europeans, and an obsession with the prominence of western Europe and Europeanized America in the modern world? Isn't that prominence just an ephemeral phenomenon of the last few centuries, now fading behind the prominence of Japan and Southeast Asia? In fact, most of this book will deal with peoples other than Europeans. Rather than focus solely on interactions between Europeans and non-Europeans, we shall also examine interactions between different non-European peoples—especially those that took place within sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, Indonesia, and New Guinea, among peoples native to those areas. Far from glorifying peoples of western European origin, we shall see that most basic elements of their civilization were developed by other peoples living elsewhere and were then imported to western Europe.
其次，回答耶利的问题是否就必然涉及以欧洲为中心的历史方法，涉及对西欧人的美化，并念念不忘于西欧和欧化了的美国在现代世界中的突出地位呢？这种突出地位是否就是过去几个世纪的一种短暂现象，而现在正由于日本和东南亚的兴起而变得暗淡起来呢？事实上，本书大部分篇幅将要讨论的是某些民族，而不是欧洲人。我们不只是把重点放在欧洲人和非欧洲人之间的相互影响上，而是还要研究不同的非欧洲民族之间的相互影响——尤其是发生在非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区、东南亚、印度尼西亚和新几内亚内部的和发生在这些地区的土著人之间的相互影响。我们绝不是要美化来自西欧的民族，而是要看到，他们的文明的最基本因素是由生活在别的地方的其他民族发展起来并在以后输入西欧的。
Third, don't words such as “civilization,” and phrases such as “rise of civilization,” convey the false impression that civilization is good, tribal hunter-gatherers are miserable, and history for the past 13,000 years has involved progress toward greater human happiness? In fact, I do not assume that industrialized states are “better” than hunter-gatherer tribes, or that the abandonment of the hunter-gatherer lifestyle for iron-based statehood represents “progress,” or that it has led to an increase in human happiness. My own impression, from having divided my life between United States cities and New Guinea villages, is that the so-called blessings of civilization are mixed. For example, compared with hunter-gatherers, citizens of modern industrialized states enjoy better medical care, lower risk of death by homicide, and a longer life span, but receive much less social support from friendships and extended families. My motive for investigating these geographic differences in human societies is not to celebrate one type of society over another but simply to understand what happened in history.
第三，诸如“文明”之类的字眼和“文明的兴起”之类的词语是不是传达了虚假的印象，即文明是好的，以狩猎采集为生的部落人是悲惨的，而过去13000年的历史已经朝着人类更大的福祉前进了？事实上，我并不想当然地认为工业化国家就一定比狩猎采集部落“好”，不认为放弃狩猎采集的生活方式来换取以使用铁器为基础的国家地位就是代表“进步”，也不认为就是这种进步为人类带来了越来越多的幸福。根据我在美国城市和新几内亚村庄不同的生活体验，我的印象是：所谓的文明的福祉是由正反两方面的因素构成的。例如，同狩猎采集部落相比，现代工业化国家的公民享有更好的医疗照顾，他们被人杀害的风险较低，他们的寿命也较长，但他们从朋友和大家庭那里得到的社会支持却要少得多。我对人类社会的这种地理差异进行调查研究的动机，不是为了赞美一种类型的社会和贬低另一种类型的社会，而完全是为了了解历史上到底发生过什么事。
DOES YALI'S QUESTION really need another book to answer it? Don't we already know the answer? If so, what is it?
耶利的问题是不是真的需要用另一本书来回答？我们是不是已经知道答案了呢？如果已经知道了，那么答案是什么呢？
Probably the commonest explanation involves implicitly or explicitly assuming biological differences among peoples. In the centuries after A.D. 1500, as European explorers became aware of the wide differences among the world's peoples in technology and political organization, they assumed that those differences arose from differences in innate ability. With the rise of Darwinian theory, explanations were recast in terms of natural selection and of evolutionary descent. Technologically primitive peoples were considered evolutionary vestiges of human descent from apelike ancestors. The displacement of such peoples by colonists from industrialized societies exemplified the survival of the fittest. With the later rise of genetics, the explanations were recast once again, in genetic terms. Europeans became considered genetically more intelligent than Africans, and especially more so than Aboriginal Australians.
大概最普通的解释就含蓄地或者明确地假定民族之间在生物学上的差异。在公元1500年后的几个世纪中，由于欧洲探险者们认识到世界各民族在技术和政治组织方面的广泛差异，他们就想当然地认为，这些差异来自天生能力的差异。随着达尔文理论的出现，原来的一些解释就按照自然选择和演化遗传有了新的含义。在技术上原始的种族被认为是人类从与猿相类似的祖先那里遗传而来的演化遗存。由来自工业化社会的移民来取代这些种族，正是适者生存的例证。随着后来遗传学的兴起，这些解释就按照遗传学的字眼又一次被重新叙述。从遗传学的角度看，欧洲人被认为比非洲人聪明，而比起澳大利亚的土著就尤其如此。
Today, segments of Western society publicly repudiate racism. Yet many (perhaps most!) Westerners continue to accept racist explanations privately or subconsciously. In Japan and many other countries, such explanations are still advanced publicly and without apology. Even educated white Americans, Europeans, and Australians, when the subject of Australian Aborigines comes up, assume that there is something primitive about the Aborigines themselves. They certainly look different from whites. Many of the living descendants of those Aborigines who survived the era of European colonization are now finding it difficult to succeed economically in white Australian society.
今天，西方社会的某些人在公开地批判种族主义。然而，许多(也许是大多数！)西方人私下里或下意识地在继续接受种族主义的解释。在日本和其他许多国家里，仍然有人在公开提出这种解释，而且是毫无愧疚之感。甚至是受过教育的美国白人、欧洲人和澳大利亚人，每当提起澳大利亚土著这个话题时，总是认为澳大利亚土著的身上有着某种原始的东西。他们看上去肯定与白人不同。在这些土著的仍然健在的后裔中，有许多人虽然在欧洲殖民时代活了下来，但现在却发现在澳大利亚白人社会中难以在经济上取得成功。
A seemingly compelling argument goes as follows. White immigrants to Australia built a literate, industrialized, politically centralized, democratic state based on metal tools and on food production, all within a century of colonizing a continent where the Aborigines had been living as tribal hunter-gatherers without metal for at least 40,000 years. Here were two successive experiments in human development, in which the environment was identical and the sole variable was the people occupying that environment. What further proof could be wanted to establish that the differences between Aboriginal Australian and European societies arose from differences between the peoples themselves?
一个看似有理的论据是这样的：到澳大利亚来的白人移民建立了一个以金属工具和食品生产为基础的、有文字的、工业化的、在政治上集中的民主国家，这一切都是在对一个大陆进行拓殖的100年中完成的，而生活在这个大陆上的土著至少有4万年之久一直是一些没有金属工具的狩猎采集部落。这是对人类发展的两个连续实验，实验的环境相同，唯一的变量是居住在这环境中的人。澳大利亚土著与欧洲人社会之间的差异是由民族本身的差异产生的，这一点难道还需要进一步来证明吗？
The objection to such racist explanations is not just that they are loathsome, but also that they are wrong. Sound evidence for the existence of human differences in intelligence that parallel human differences in technology is lacking. In fact, as I shall explain in a moment, modern “Stone Age” peoples are on the average probably more intelligent, not less intelligent, than industrialized peoples. Paradoxical as it may sound, we shall see in Chapter 15 that white immigrants to Australia do not deserve the credit usually accorded to them for building a literate industrialized society with the other virtues mentioned above. In addition, peoples who until recently were technologically primitive—such as Aboriginal Australians and New Guineans—routinely master industrial technologies when given opportunities to do so.
对这种种族主义解释的反对意见，不仅仅是因为这种解释令人生厌，而且也因为它们是错误的。人类在智力上存在着差异，但并没有可靠的证据足以证明这种差异是与技术上的差异平行发生的。事实上，我马上还将说明，现代的“石器时代”的部落通常可能比工业化的民族更加聪明，或至少一样聪明。虽然这听起来可能有点荒谬，但我们将会在第十五章看到，对于建立一个具有上述其他优点的、有文字的工业化社会来说，来到澳大利亚的白人移民对于通常给予他们的荣誉是受之有愧的。此外，直到最近在技术上仍很原始的部族——如澳大利亚的土著和新几内亚人——只要给他们机会，一般是都能掌握工业技术的。
An enormous effort by cognitive psychologists has gone into the search for differences in IQ between peoples of different geographic origins now living in the same country. In particular, numerous white American psychologists have been trying for decades to demonstrate that black Americans of African origins are innately less intelligent than white Americans of European origins. However, as is well known, the peoples compared differ greatly in their social environment and educational opportunities. This fact creates double difficulties for efforts to test the hypothesis that intellectual differences underlie technological differences. First, even our cognitive abilities as adults are heavily influenced by the social environment that we experienced during childhood, making it hard to discern any influence of preexisting genetic differences. Second, tests of cognitive ability (like IQ tests) tend to measure cultural learning and not pure innate intelligence, whatever that is. Because of those undoubted effects of childhood environment and learned knowledge on IQ test results, the psychologists' efforts to date have not succeeded in convincingly establishing the postulated genetic deficiency in IQs of nonwhite peoples.
一些认知心理学家以巨大的努力研究了生活在同一国家的来自不同地理区域的民族之间在智商方面的差异。尤其是，有许多美国白人心理学家在过去几十年中一直试图证明，非洲裔美国黑人在智力上天生地就低于欧洲裔美国白人。然而，众所周知，用作比较的这两个民族在社会环境和教育机会方面是大不相同的。这个事实使检验智力差异引起技术差异这种假设遇到了双重的困难。首先，甚至我们成人的认知能力也要受到社会环境的严重影响，而我们在孩提时代就已经历了这样的环境，因而难以觉察先天遗传差异的任何影响。其次，认知能力的测验(和智商测验一样)往往都是测量文化学习，而不是测量纯粹的天生智力，不管这种天生智力究竟是什么东西。由于童年环境和所学得的知识对智商测验结果所产生的这些无庸置疑的影响，这些心理学家迄今为止所作的努力，都未能找到令人信服的证据来证明非白人民族的智商中被视为当然的遗传缺陷。
My perspective on this controversy comes from 33 years of working with New Guineans in their own intact societies. From the very beginning of my work with New Guineans, they impressed me as being on the average more intelligent, more alert, more expressive, and more interested in things and people around them than the average European or American is. At some tasks that one might reasonably suppose to reflect aspects of brain function, such as the ability to form a mental map of unfamiliar surroundings, they appear considerably more adept than Westerners. Of course, New Guineans tend to perform poorly at tasks that Westerners have been trained to perform since childhood and that New Guineans have not. Hence when unschooled New Guineans from remote villages visit towns, they look stupid to Westerners. Conversely, I am constantly aware of how stupid I look to New Guineans when I'm with them in the jungle, displaying my incompetence at simple tasks (such as following a jungle trail or erecting a shelter) at which New Guineans have been trained since childhood and I have not.
我对这一争议的观点，是我和新几内亚人在他们的未受外界影响的社会里一起工作了33年的结果。从我刚开始和新几内亚人一起工作的时候，他们给我的印象是，他们通常都要比一般欧洲人或美国人更聪明，更机敏，更富表现力，对周围的事和人也更关心。对有些工作，人们完全可以认为是反映了脑功能的某些方面的，例如在脑子里对陌生环境勾画出一幅图像的能力。在做这样的工作时，新几内亚人在很大程度上显得比西方人更加出色在行。当然，对于那些西方人从小就训练去做而新几内亚人从来没有做过的工作，新几内亚人也常常做得不好。因此，来自偏远村庄的未上过学的新几内亚人在进城时，在西方人看来他们显得呆头呆脑；反之，当我和新几内亚人一起在丛林中时，我表现得连做一些简单的工作(如沿着丛林小路行走或搭建一个遮蔽物)都不能胜任。在这种时候，我始终明白，我在新几内亚人看来又是多么地呆头呆脑。对这些工作，新几内亚人从小就接受了训练，而我则从来没有。
It's easy to recognize two reasons why my impression that New Guineans are smarter than Westerners may be correct. First, Europeans have for thousands of years been living in densely populated societies with central governments, police, and judiciaries. In those societies, infectious epidemic diseases of dense populations (such as smallpox) were historically the major cause of death, while murders were relatively uncommon and a state of war was the exception rather than the rule. Most Europeans who escaped fatal infections also escaped other potential causes of death and proceeded to pass on their genes. Today, most live-born Western infants survive fatal infections as well and reproduce themselves, regardless of their intelligence and the genes they bear. In contrast, New Guineans have been living in societies where human numbers were too low for epidemic diseases of dense populations to evolve. Instead, traditional New Guineans suffered high mortality from murder, chronic tribal warfare, accidents, and problems in procuring food.
为什么我觉得新几内亚人比西方人聪明这种印象可能是正确的，有两个理由容易得到认可。首先，几千年来，西方人一直生活在有中央政府、警察和法制的、人口稠密的社会里。在这些社会里，稠密人口中传染性的流行疾病(如天花)在历史上是导致死亡的主因，而谋杀则比较罕见，至于战争状态则是例外，而不是普遍情况。大多数逃脱了致命的传染病的欧洲人，也逃脱了其他一些潜在的死因，并把他们的基因传给后代。今天，西方大多数存活的婴儿同样逃过了致命的传染疾病，而且不管他们的智力和携带的基因如何，一样地传宗接代。相比之下，新几内亚人所生活的社会，由于人口稀少，稠密人口中发生的那些流行疾病无法形成。相反，造成新几内亚人传统的高死亡率的，是谋杀、长期的部落战争、意外事故和在获取食物中出现的问题。
Intelligent people are likelier than less intelligent ones to escape those causes of high mortality in traditional New Guinea societies. However, the differential mortality from epidemic diseases in traditional European societies had little to do with intelligence, and instead involved genetic resistance dependent on details of body chemistry. For example, people with blood group B or O have a greater resistance to smallpox than do people with blood group A. That is, natural selection promoting genes for intelligence has probably been far more ruthless in New Guinea than in more densely populated, politically complex societies, where natural selection for body chemistry was instead more potent.
在传统的新几内亚社会中，聪明人比不那么聪明的人更有可能逃脱导致高死亡率的死因。然而，在传统的欧洲社会中，流行性疾病造成的死亡率的差异与智力几乎没有任何关系，而是与取决于人体化学细节的遗传抵抗力有关。例如，血型为B或O的人比血型为A的人对天花有更强的抵抗力。就是说，促进智力基因的自然选择，在新几内亚比在人口稠密、政治上复杂的社会可能要无情得多，因为在这样的社会里，对人体化学组成的自然选择反而更有效力。
Besides this genetic reason, there is also a second reason why New Guineans may have come to be smarter than Westerners. Modern European and American children spend much of their time being passively entertained by television, radio, and movies. In the average American household, the TV set is on for seven hours per day. In contrast, traditional New Guinea children have virtually no such opportunities for passive entertainment and instead spend almost all of their waking hours actively doing something, such as talking or playing with other children or adults. Almost all studies of child development emphasize the role of childhood stimulation and activity in promoting mental development, and stress the irreversible mental stunting associated with reduced childhood stimulation. This effect surely contributes a non-genetic component to the superior average mental function displayed by New Guineans.
关于为什么新几内亚人可能会比西方人聪明这一点，除了这种遗传上的原因，还有第二个原因。现代欧洲和美国的儿童花费大量的时间，被动地接受电视、广播和电影所提供的娱乐。在一般的美国家庭中，电视机每天开7个小时。相比之下，传统的新几内亚儿童几乎没有机会去接受这种被动的娱乐，而是把他们醒着的时间几乎全部用来从事积极的活动，如和其他儿童或成年人谈话或游戏。几乎所有的对儿童发展的研究全都强调童年刺激和活动在促进智力发展中的作用，同时着重指出了与童年刺激减少相联系的不可逆转的智力障碍。对于新几内亚人表现出来的这种较优越的一般智力作用，这种影响无疑提供了一种非遗传成分。
That is, in mental ability New Guineans are probably genetically superior to Westerners, and they surely are superior in escaping the devastating developmental disadvantages under which most children in industrialized societies now grow up. Certainly, there is no hint at all of any intellectual disadvantage of New Guineans that could serve to answer Yali's question. The same two genetic and childhood developmental factors are likely to distinguish not only New Guineans from Westerners, but also hunter-gatherers and other members of technologically primitive societies from members of technologically advanced societies in general. Thus, the usual racist assumption has to be turned on its head. Why is it that Europeans, despite their likely genetic disadvantage and (in modern times) their undoubted developmental disadvantage, ended up with much more of the cargo? Why did New Guineans wind up technologically primitive, despite what I believe to be their superior intelligence?
这就是说，就智力而言，新几内亚人可能在遗传方面优于西方人，他们在逃避对成长极其不利的条件时也肯定优于西方人，而工业化社会的大多数儿童如今就是在这种条件下长大的。当然，关于新几内亚人在智力方面的任何不利条件，没有丝毫可以用来回答耶利的问题。遗传和童年成长这两个因素，可能不仅区别了新几内亚人同西方人，而且也区别了以狩猎采集为生的人以及技术上原始的社会成员同一般说来在技术上先进的社会成员。因此，必须把种族主义素来的那种臆断颠倒过来。欧洲人尽管在遗传方面存在着不利条件，而且(在现代)他们在成长中也毫无疑问存在着不利条件，那么为什么他们最后却能生产出很多货物？而对于新几内亚人，尽管我相信他们具有较高的智力，但为什么他们最后在技术上还是那样原始呢？
A GENETIC EXPLANATION isn't the only possible answer to Yali's question. Another one, popular with inhabitants of northern Europe, invokes the supposed stimulatory effects of their homeland's cold climate and the inhibitory effects of hot, humid, tropical climates on human creativity and energy. Perhaps the seasonally variable climate at high latitudes poses more diverse challenges than does a seasonally constant tropical climate. Perhaps cold climates require one to be more technologically inventive to survive, because one must build a warm home and make warm clothing, whereas one can survive in the tropics with simpler housing and no clothing. Or the argument can be reversed to reach the same conclusion: the long winters at high latitudes leave people with much time in which to sit indoors and invent.
遗传学上的解释不是对耶利问题的唯一可能的答案。另一种受到北欧人欢迎的解释是求助于想象中的气候作用，说什么他们家乡的寒冷气候对人的创造力和精力具有刺激作用，而炎热、潮湿的热带气候则对人的创造力和精力具有抑制作用。也许，高纬度的这种季节性的多变气候比不随季节变化的恒定的热带气候提出了更多的各式各样的挑战。也许，寒冷的气候要求人们为了生存必须具有更多的创造才能，因为人们必须建造保暖的住宅和缝制保暖的衣裳，而在热带人们只要有较简陋的住房并且不穿衣服就能生存下去。或者，可以把这种论点颠倒过来以得出同样的结论：高纬度地区漫长的冬季使人们有大量时间可以坐在家里搞发明创造。
Although formerly popular, this type of explanation, too, fails to survive scrutiny. As we shall see, the peoples of northern Europe contributed nothing of fundamental importance to Eurasian civilization until the last thousand years; they simply had the good luck to live at a geographic location where they were likely to receive advances (such as agriculture, wheels, writing, and metallurgy) developed in warmer parts of Eurasia. In the New World the cold regions at high latitude were even more of a human backwater. The sole Native American societies to develop writing arose in Mexico south of the Tropic of Cancer; the oldest New World pottery comes from near the equator in tropical South America; and the New World society generally considered the most advanced in art, astronomy, and other respects was the Classic Maya society of the tropical Yucatán and Guatemala in the first millennium A.D.
虽然这种解释以前曾流行一时，但它同样经不起推敲。我们将要看到，直到最近的1000年前，北欧各民族对欧亚大陆文明没有作出过任何极其重要的贡献；他们只是由于运气好才生活在某一个地理位置上，使他们有可能接受在欧亚大陆较温暖地区发展起来的一些先进的东西(如农业、轮子、文字和冶金)。在新大陆，高纬度的寒冷地区则甚至更是人类的一个落后地区。唯一的发明了文字的印第安人社会出现在北回归线以南的墨西哥；新大陆最古老的陶器来自位于热带的南美洲赤道附近；而通常被认为在艺术、天文学和其他方面最先进的新大陆社会是在公元第一个一千年中位于热带的尤卡坦半岛和危地马拉的历史上有名的马雅社会。
Still a third type of answer to Yali invokes the supposed importance of lowland river valleys in dry climates, where highly productive agriculture depended on large-scale irrigation systems that in turn required centralized bureaucracies. This explanation was suggested by the undoubted fact that the earliest known empires and writing systems arose in the Tigris and Euphrates Valleys of the Fertile Crescent and in the Nile Valley of Egypt. Water control systems also appear to have been associated with centralized political organization in some other areas of the world, including the Indus Valley of the Indian subcontinent, the Yellow and Yangtze Valleys of China, the Maya lowlands of Mesoamerica, and the coastal desert of Peru.
对耶利的问题的第三个答案提出了所谓干燥气候下低地河谷的重要性问题，因为这种地方的高产农业依赖于大规模的灌溉系统，而这又需要有权力集中的政府机构。之所以提出这种解释，是因为有一个事实是无庸置疑的，即已知的最早帝国和书写系统出现在新月沃地[1]
的底格里斯河和幼发拉底河流域以及埃及的尼罗河流域。在世界上的其他一些地区，包括印度次大陆的印度河流域、中国的黄河和长江流域、中美洲的马雅人居住的低地和秘鲁的沿海沙漠，水利系统也似乎与中央集权的政治组织密切有关。
However, detailed archaeological studies have shown that complex irrigation systems did not accompany the rise of centralized bureaucracies but followed after a considerable lag. That is, political centralization arose for some other reason and then permitted construction of complex irrigation systems. None of the crucial developments preceding political centralization in those same parts of the world were associated with river valleys or with complex irrigation systems. For example, in the Fertile Crescent food production and village life originated in hills and mountains, not in lowland river valleys. The Nile Valley remained a cultural backwater for about 3,000 years after village food production began to flourish in the hills of the Fertile Crescent. River valleys of the southwestern United States eventually came to support irrigation agriculture and complex societies, but only after many of the developments on which those societies rested had been imported from Mexico. The river valleys of southeastern Australia remained occupied by tribal societies without agriculture.
然而，详尽的考古研究表明，复杂的灌溉系统并不是同权力集中的政府机构一起出现，而是在过了相当一段时间之后才到来的。就是说，先是由于某种原因出现了政治集权，然后才有可能建设复杂的灌溉系统。在世界上的这些地区，在政治集权之前发生的至关重要的发展，没有一个是同江河流域或复杂的灌溉系统有任何联系。例如，新月沃地的粮食生产和乡村生活源于丘陵和山地，而不是源于低地河谷。在乡村粮食生产开始在新月沃地的丘陵地带兴旺发达之后3000年左右，尼罗河流域仍然是一个文化落后的地区。美国西南部的江河流域最后还是对灌溉农业和复杂社会起了支撑作用，但只是在有了许多为社会所依赖的发展成果之后才做到这一点的，而这些发展成果却是从墨西哥引进的。澳大利亚东南部的河谷仍然为没有农业的部落社会所占有。
Yet another type of explanation lists the immediate factors that enabled Europeans to kill or conquer other peoples—especially European guns, infectious diseases, steel tools, and manufactured products. Such an explanation is on the right track, as those factors demonstrably were directly responsible for European conquests. However, this hypothesis is incomplete, because it still offers only a proximate (first-stage) explanation identifying immediate causes. It invites a search for ultimate causes: why were Europeans, rather than Africans or Native Americans, the ones to end up with guns, the nastiest germs, and steel?
然而，还有一种解释列举了使欧洲人能够屠杀或征服其他民族的直接因素——尤其是欧洲的枪炮、传染病、钢铁工具和工业制成品。这种解释是正确的，因为显而易见，这些因素都是造成欧洲人征服的直接原因。然而，这种假设是不全面的，因为它仍然只提供了确定直接原因的一种近似的(初级阶段的)解释。它使人不由得想去寻找终极原因：为什么最后带来枪炮、凶恶的病菌和钢铁的竟是欧洲人，而不是非洲人或印第安人？
While some progress has been made in identifying those ultimate causes in the case of Europe's conquest of the New World, Africa remains a big puzzle. Africa is the continent where protohumans evolved for the longest time, where anatomically modern humans may also have arisen, and where native diseases like malaria and yellow fever killed European explorers. If a long head start counts for anything, why didn't guns and steel arise first in Africa, permitting Africans and their germs to conquer Europe? And what accounts for the failure of Aboriginal Australians to pass beyond the stage of hunter-gatherers with stone tools?
至于在确定欧洲征服新大陆的终极原因方面，虽然已经取得了某些进展，但非洲仍然是一大难题。在非洲这个大陆上，原人进化的时间最长，解剖学上的现代人可能也起源于那里，那里的地方病如疟疾或黄热病使欧洲的探险者失去了生命。如果长期的领先优势有什么价值的话，那么为什么枪炮和钢铁不是首先出现在非洲，从而使非洲人和他们的病菌得以征服欧洲？同时，又用什么来说明何以澳大利亚土著未能超越使用石器的狩猎采集阶段呢？
Questions that emerge from worldwide comparisons of human societies formerly attracted much attention from historians and geographers. The best-known modern example of such an effort was Arnold Toynbee's 12-volume Study of History. Toynbee was especially interested in the internal dynamics of 23 advanced civilizations, of which 22 were literate and 19 were Eurasian. He was less interested in prehistory and in simpler, nonliterate societies. Yet the roots of inequality in the modern world lie far back in prehistory. Hence Toynbee did not pose Yali's question, nor did he come to grips with what I see as history's broadest pattern. Other available books on world history similarly tend to focus on advanced literate Eurasian civilizations of the last 5,000 years; they have a very brief treatment of pre-Columbian Native American civilizations, and an even briefer discussion of the rest of the world except for its recent interactions with Eurasian civilizations. Since Toynbee's attempt, worldwide syntheses of historical causation have fallen into disfavor among most historians, as posing an apparently intractable problem.
在世界范围内对人类社会进行比较所出现的问题，曾经引起历史学家和地理学家们的极大关注。说明这方面的努力的最著名的现代例证，就是阿诺德·汤因比[2]
的十二卷本的《历史研究》。汤因比对23个先进的文明民族尤其感到兴趣，这23个民族中有22个是有文字的，19个是欧亚大陆民族。他对史前史和比较单纯的没有文字的社会兴趣较少。然而，现代世界不平等的根源却要追溯到史前阶段。因此，汤因比没有提出耶利的那种问题，也没有去认真讨论我所认为的最广泛的历史模式。其他一些研究世界史的可资利用的书，同样会把重点放在以往5000年中先进的、有文字的欧亚大陆文明民族身上；这些书都是十分简略地提到哥伦布以前的印第安人文明，除了谈到最近与欧亚大陆文明民族的相互影响外，它们对世界其余地区的讨论甚至更加简略。在汤因比的尝试后，全世界对历史因果关系的综合研究已经受到大多数历史学家的冷遇，被认为提出了一个显然难以解决的问题。
Specialists from several disciplines have provided global syntheses of their subjects. Especially useful contributions have been made by ecological geographers, cultural anthropologists, biologists studying plant and animal domestication, and scholars concerned with the impact of infectious diseases on history. These studies have called attention to parts of the puzzle, but they provide only pieces of the needed broad synthesis that has been missing.
来自几个学科的专家对他们的问题提供了全球性的综合研究。尤其是一些生态地理学家、文化人类学家、研究动植物驯化的生物学家和研究传染病对历史的影响的学者们在这方面已经作出了有益的贡献。这些研究已经引起了人们对这个难题的某些部分的注意，但它们所提供的只是那一直阙如的必要而广泛的综合研究的零碎片断而已。
Thus, there is no generally accepted answer to Yali's question. On the one hand, the proximate explanations are clear: some peoples developed guns, germs, steel, and other factors conferring political and economic power before others did; and some peoples never developed these power factors at all. On the other hand, the ultimate explanations—for example, why bronze tools appeared early in parts of Eurasia, late and only locally in the New World, and never in Aboriginal Australia—remain unclear.
因此，对于耶利的问题不存在可以普遍接受的答案。一方面，这种近似的解释是清楚的：有些民族在其他民族之前就已有了枪炮、病菌、钢铁和带来政治与经济影响力的其他因素；而有些民族则根本没有过这些带来影响力的因素。另一方面，这种终极解释——例如，为什么青铜器很早就在欧亚大陆的一些地区出现，在新大陆是很晚才在局部地区出现，而在土著人的澳大利亚则从来没有出现过——仍然是不清楚的。
Our present lack of such ultimate explanations leaves a big intellectual gap, since the broadest pattern of history thus remains unexplained. Much more serious, though, is the moral gap left unfilled. It is perfectly obvious to everyone, whether an overt racist or not, that different peoples have fared differently in history. The modern United States is a European-molded society, occupying lands conquered from Native Americans and incorporating the descendants of millions of sub-Saharan black Africans brought to America as slaves. Modern Europe is not a society molded by sub-Saharan black Africans who brought millions of Native Americans as slaves.
我们目前缺乏这种终极解释，留下了一个巨大的知识缺口，因为最广泛的历史模式仍然是这样原因不明。然而，更为严重得多的是道德缺口没有得到充填。对每个人来说，不管他是不是明目张胆的种族主义者，至为明显的是，历史上不同民族的情况是不同的。现代美国是一个按照欧洲模式创建的社会，它占有从印第安人那里掠夺来的土地，吸纳了数以百万计的作为奴隶运到美洲来的非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区黑人的后裔。现代欧洲却不是一个由非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区黑人塑造的社会，他们并没有把数以百万计的印第安人作为奴隶运入欧洲。
These results are completely lopsided: it was not the case that 51 percent of the Americas, Australia, and Africa was conquered by Europeans, while 49 percent of Europe was conquered by Native Americans, Aboriginal Australians, or Africans. The whole modern world has been shaped by lopsided outcomes. Hence they must have inexorable explanations, ones more basic than mere details concerning who happened to win some battle or develop some invention on one occasion a few thousand years ago.
这种结果完全是一边倒的：这里的情况不是51%的美洲、澳洲和非洲被欧洲人征服，而49%的欧洲被印第安人、澳大利亚土著或非洲人征服。整个现代世界都是由一边倒的结果来塑造的。这些结果必须得到不容变更的解释，这些解释应该比几百年前谁碰巧打赢了某个战役或谁在某一次发明了什么东西这些细节更为基本。
It seems logical to suppose that history's pattern reflects innate differences among people themselves. Of course, we're taught that it's not polite to say so in public. We read of technical studies claiming to demonstrate inborn differences, and we also read rebuttals claiming that those studies suffer from technical flaws. We see in our daily lives that some of the conquered peoples continue to form an underclass, centuries after the conquests or slave imports took place. We're told that this too is to be attributed not to any biological shortcomings but to social disadvantages and limited opportunities.
假定历史模式反映了民族之间的天生差异，这似乎是合乎逻辑的。当然，我们得到的教导是，公开地这样说是不礼貌的。我们读到了一些声称证明了天生差异的专门性研究成果；我们也读到了声称这些研究具有专门性谬误的反驳意见。我们在日常生活中看到，在发生征服和奴隶贩运的几百年之后，有些被征服民族仍然构成了下层社会。我们听说，这一点同样不应归咎于任何生物学上的缺陷，而应归咎于社会不利条件和有限的机会。
Nevertheless, we have to wonder. We keep seeing all those glaring, persistent differences in peoples' status. We're assured that the seemingly transparent biological explanation for the world's inequalities as of A.D. 1500 is wrong, but we're not told what the correct explanation is. Until we have some convincing, detailed, agreed-upon explanation for the broad pattern of history, most people will continue to suspect that the racist biological explanation is correct after all. That seems to me the strongest argument for writing this book.
尽管如此，我们还是不得不感到疑惑。我们始终看到的是所有那些引人注目的持久不变的民族地位差异。有人向我们保证说，这种对公元1500年以来世界上的不平等所作的貌似清晰的解释是错误的，但却没有人告诉我们正确的解释是什么。在我们对历史的广泛模式有了某种令人信服的、详尽的、得到一致同意的解释之前，大多数人将继续认为，种族主义的生物学解释终究是正确的。对我来说，这似乎就是写这本书的最强有力的论点。
AUTHORS ARE REGULARLY asked by journalists to summarize a long book in one sentence. For this book, here is such a sentence: “History followed different courses for different peoples because of differences among peoples' environments, not because of biological differences among peoples themselves.”
新闻记者总是要求作者用一句话把篇幅很长的书加以概括。对本书来说，这样的一句话就是：“不同民族的历史遵循不同的道路前进，其原因是民族环境的差异，而不是民族自身在生物学上的差异。”
Naturally, the notion that environmental geography and biogeography influenced societal development is an old idea. Nowadays, though, the view is not held in esteem by historians; it is considered wrong or simplistic, or it is caricatured as environmental determinism and dismissed, or else the whole subject of trying to understand worldwide differences is shelved as too difficult. Yet geography obviously has some effect on history; the open question concerns how much effect, and whether geography can account for history's broad pattern.
当然，环境地理和生物地理影响社会发展，这并不是什么新的观念。然而在今天，这种观点已得不到历史学家们的青睐；它被认为是错误的或过分简单化的，或者被讽刺为环境决定论而不屑一顾，或者把企图了解世界范围内的差异这整个问题看得太难而束之高阁。然而，地理显然对历史产生了某种影响；有待回答的问题是这种影响的程度如何，以及地理是否能够说明历史的广泛模式。
The time is now ripe for a fresh look at these questions, because of new information from scientific disciplines seemingly remote from human history. Those disciplines include, above all, genetics, molecular biology, and biogeography as applied to crops and their wild ancestors; the same disciplines plus behavioral ecology, as applied to domestic animals and their wild ancestors; molecular biology of human germs and related germs of animals; epidemiology of human diseases; human genetics; linguistics; archaeological studies on all continents and major islands; and studies of the histories of technology, writing, and political organization.
由于有几门从表面上看似乎与人类历史毫不相干的科学学科所提供的新的知识，以新的眼光来看待这些问题的时机已经成熟了。这些学科首先包括遗传学、分子生物学和涉及农作物及其原始野种的生物地理学；这些学科再加上涉及家畜及其原始野种的行为生态学；研究人类病菌及有关动物病菌的分子生物学；研究人类疾病的流行病学；人类遗传学；语言学；对所有大陆和主要岛屿进行的考古研究；以及对技术、文字和政治组织的历史研究。
This diversity of disciplines poses problems for would-be authors of a book aimed at answering Yali's question. The author must possess a range of expertise spanning the above disciplines, so that relevant advances can be synthesized. The history and prehistory of each continent must be similarly synthesized. The book's subject matter is history, but the approach is that of science—in particular, that of historical sciences such as evolutionary biology and geology. The author must understand from firsthand experience a range of human societies, from hunter-gatherer societies to modern space-age civilizations.
这种学科的多样性向想要写一本书来回答耶利的问题的未来作者提出了一些问题。这样的作者必须具有包括以上各学科的广博的专业知识，这样才能把相关的各种先进知识加以综合。每个大陆的历史和史前史都必须同样地加以综合。这本书的主要内容是历史，但所用的方法则是科学的——尤其是诸如演化生物学和地质学之类历史科学的方法。这样的作者必须根据直接体验来了解一系列人类社会，从狩猎采集社会到现代的太空时代文明，都要有所了解。
These requirements seem at first to demand a multi-author work. Yet that approach would be doomed from the outset, because the essence of the problem is to develop a unified synthesis. That consideration dictates single authorship, despite all the difficulties that it poses. Inevitably, that single author will have to sweat copiously in order to assimilate material from many disciplines, and will require guidance from many colleagues.
这些条件初看起来似乎是要求多个作者协同工作。然而，这种办法从一开始就注定要失败，因为这个问题的实质是要建立一种统一的综合体系。这种考虑就规定了只能有一个作者，尽管这样做会引起种种困难。不可避免的是，这个作者为了从许多学科吸收材料将不得不浑身冒汗，并且将会需要许多同事对他进行指导。
My background had led me to several of these disciplines even before Yali put his question to me in 1972. My mother is a teacher and linguist; my father, a physician specializing in the genetics of childhood diseases. Because of my father's example, I went through school expecting to become a physician. I had also become a fanatical bird-watcher by the age of seven. It was thus an easy step, in my last undergraduate year at university, to shift from my initial goal of medicine to the goal of biological research. However, throughout my school and undergraduate years, my training was mainly in languages, history, and writing. Even after deciding to obtain a Ph.D. in physiology, I nearly dropped out of science during my first year of graduate school to become a linguist.
甚至在耶利于1972年向我提出他的问题之前，我的经历已经使我涉足这些学科中的几门。我的母亲是教师兼语言学家；我的父亲是儿童遗传疾病专科医师。由于有了我的父亲做榜样，我怀着当医生的志向完成了我的小学和中学学业。在7岁时，我还成了一个狂热的观察和研究野鸟的人。因此，在我大学本科的最后一年，我很容易地就从起初想要从事医务工作这个目标转向生物研究这个目标。然而，从小学一直到大学，我的训练主要在语言、历史和写作方面。甚至在决定要取得生理学博士学位之后，我在研究院的第一年还差点放弃科学而去做一个语言学家。
Since completing my Ph.D. in 1961, I have divided my scientific research efforts between two fields: molecular physiology on the one hand, evolutionary biology and biogeography on the other hand. As an unforeseen bonus for the purposes of this book, evolutionary biology is a historical science forced to use methods different from those of the laboratory sciences. That experience has made the difficulties in devising a scientific approach to human history familiar to me. Living in Europe from 1958 to 1962, among European friends whose lives had been brutally traumatized by 20th-century European history, made me start to think more seriously about how chains of causes operate in history's unfolding.
1961年我完成了博士学业后，就把我的科学研究分成两个领域去进行：一个是分子生理学，一个是演化生物学和生物地理学。演化生物学是一门历史科学，只能使用一些不同于实验科学的方法，这对于我写作本书却带来了意想不到的帮助。要设计出一种研究人类历史的方法会有许多困难，但我在这方面的经验使我对这些困难了然于胸。从1958年到1962年，我在欧洲生活，我的一些欧洲朋友的生活曾经遭到20世纪历史的严重伤害，生活在他们中间使我开始更加认真地思考在历史的展开中因果链是在如何起作用的。
For the last 33 years my fieldwork as an evolutionary biologist has brought me into close contact with a wide range of human societies. My specialty is bird evolution, which I have studied in South America, southern Africa, Indonesia, Australia, and especially New Guinea. Through living with native peoples of these areas, I have become familiar with many technologically primitive human societies, from those of hunter-gatherers to those of tribal farmers and fishing peoples who depended until recently on stone tools. Thus, what most literate people would consider strange lifestyles of remote prehistory are for me the most vivid part of my life. New Guinea, though it accounts for only a small fraction of the world's land area, encompasses a disproportionate fraction of its human diversity. Of the modern world's 6,000 languages. 1,000 are confined to New Guinea. In the course of my work on New Guinea birds, my interests in language were rekindled, by the need to elicit lists of local names of bird species in nearly 100 of those New Guinea languages.
在过去的33年中，我作为演化生物学家的现场调查工作，使我同范围广泛的人类社会产生了密切的接触。我的专业是鸟类演化，我在南美、南部非洲、印度尼西亚、澳大利亚，特别是新几内亚，曾经做过这方面的研究。通过同这些地区的土著人在一起生活，我熟悉了许多技术上原始的社会，从狩猎采集社会到不久前还依靠石器的部落农民和渔民们的社会。因此，大多数有文化的人认为不可思议的、遥远的史前期生活方式，却是我的生活中最鲜明生动的部分。新几内亚尽管只占世界陆地面积的很小一部分，但它所包含的人类多样性却大得不成比例。在现代世界上的6000种语言中，有1000种只在新几内亚使用。在我研究新几内亚鸟类的过程中，由于需要用近100种新几内亚语言列出一些鸟类的俗名，我对语言的兴趣被重新激发出来了。
Out of all those interests grew my most recent book, a nontechnical account of human evolution entitled The Third Chimpanzee. Its Chapter 14, called “Accidental Conquerors,” sought to understand the outcome of the encounter between Europeans and Native Americans. After I had completed that book, I realized that other modern, as well as prehistoric, encounters between peoples raised similar questions. I saw that the question with which I had wrestled in that Chapter 14 was in essence the question Yali had asked me in 1972, merely transferred to a different part of the world. And so at last, with the help of many friends, I shall attempt to satisfy Yali's curiosity—and my own.
所有这些兴趣产生了我最近的一本书，这是对人类进化的一种非技术性的描述，书名叫做《第三种黑猩猩》。这本书的第十四章叫做《意外的征服者》，是试图了解欧洲人同印第安人接触所产生的后果。在我完成了这本书之后，我认识到无论是史前时代还是现代，民族之间的接触产生了同样的问题。我明白，我在那本书的第十四章中努力解决的问题，实质上就是1972年耶利问我的那个问题，只不过把问题搬到世界上的一个不同的地方罢了。就这样，在许多朋友的帮助下，我终于可以试一试去满足耶利的——也是我自己的好奇心。
THIS BOOK'S CHAPTERS are divided into four parts. Part 1, entitled “From Eden to Cajamarca,” consists of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides a whirlwind tour of human evolution and history, extending from our divergence from apes, around 7 million years ago, until the end of the last Ice Age, around 13,000 years ago. We shall trace the spread of ancestral humans, from our origins in Africa to the other continents, in order to understand the state of the world just before the events often lumped into the term “rise of civilization” began. It turns out that human development on some continents got a head start in time over developments on others.
本书分为4个部分。第一部分题为《从伊甸园到卡哈马卡》，它由3章组成。第一章提供了一次关于人类进化和历史的旋风式的旅行，从大约700万年前我们刚从类人猿分化出来时开始，一直延续到大约13000年前上一次冰期结束为止。我们将追踪人类的祖先从我们在非洲的发祥地散布到其他大陆，以便弄清楚在那些常常用“文明的兴起”一语来加以概括的事件开始前世界是什么情形。结果表明，某些大陆上的人类发展经过一段时间后取得了对其他大陆上的人类发展的领先优势。
Chapter 2 prepares us for exploring effects of continental environments on history over the past 13,000 years, by briefly examining effects of island environments on history over smaller time scales and areas. When ancestral Polynesians spread into the Pacific around 3,200 years ago, they encountered islands differing greatly in their environments. Within a few millennia that single ancestral Polynesian society had spawned on those diverse islands a range of diverse daughter societies, from hunter-gatherer tribes to proto-empires. That radiation can serve as a model for the longer, larger-scale, and less understood radiation of societies on different continents since the end of the last Ice Age, to become variously hunter-gatherer tribes and empires.
第二章简要地考察了岛屿环境在较小的时空范围内对历史的影响，从而使我们为探究过去13000年中大陆环境对历史的影响作好准备。当大约3200年前波利尼西亚人祖先向太平洋迁移的时候，他们碰到了一些和他们原来的环境大不相同的岛屿。在几千年之内，波利尼西亚人祖先建立的这个社会在这些形形色色的岛屿上产生了一系列子社会，从狩猎采集部落到原始帝国，形形色色，应有尽有。这种辐射性进化可以起到模式的作用，用来说明自上次冰期结束以来，在不同的大陆上时间更长、规模更大、但更少为人所了解的社会辐射性进化，为什么有的成了狩猎采集部落，有的却成了帝国。
The third chapter introduces us to collisions between peoples from different continents, by retelling through contemporary eyewitness accounts the most dramatic such encounter in history: the capture of the last independent Inca emperor, Atahuallpa, in the presence of his whole army, by Francisco Pizarro and his tiny band of conquistadores, at the Peruvian city of Cajamarca. We can identify the chain of proximate factors that enabled Pizarro to capture Atahuallpa, and that operated in European conquests of other Native American societies as well. Those factors included Spanish germs, horses, literacy, political organization, and technology (especially ships and weapons). That analysis of proximate causes is the easy part of this book; the hard part is to identify the ultimate causes leading to them and to the actual outcome, rather than to the opposite possible outcome of Atahuallpa's coming to Madrid and capturing King Charles I of Spain.
第三章通过同时代目击者的描述，再讲一讲历史上最具戏剧性的诸如此类的遭遇，从而向我们介绍来自不同大陆的各民族之间的冲突。历史上的这次遭遇是：独立的印加帝国的末代皇帝阿塔瓦尔帕在自己的整个军队的护卫下，在秘鲁城市卡哈马卡被弗兰西斯科·皮萨罗和他率领的一小撮西班牙入侵者俘虏。我们可以确定一些近似因素的锁链，正是这些因素使皮萨罗得以俘虏阿塔瓦尔帕，并在欧洲人对美洲印第安人的征服中发生了作用。这些因素包括西班牙的病菌、马匹、文化、政治组织和技术(尤其是造船和武器制造)。这种对近似原因的分析是本书中容易做到的部分；困难的部分是确定终极原因，因为正是终极原因产生了近似原因，产生了实际结果，而不是产生可能相反的结果，即阿塔瓦尔帕到马德里俘虏了西班牙国王查理一世。
Part 2, entitled “The Rise and Spread of Food Production” and consisting of Chapters 4–10, is devoted to what I believe to be the most important constellation of ultimate causes. Chapter 4 sketches how food production—that is, the growing of food by agriculture or herding, instead of the hunting and gathering of wild foods—ultimately led to the immediate factors permitting Pizarro's triumph. But the rise of food production varied around the globe. As we shall see in Chapter 5, peoples in some parts of the world developed food production by themselves; some other peoples acquired it in prehistoric times from those independent centers; and still others neither developed nor acquired food production prehistorically but remained hunter-gatherers until modern times. Chapter 6 explores the numerous factors driving the shift from the hunter-gatherer lifestyle toward food production, in some areas but not in others.
第二部分题为《粮食生产的出现和传播》，包括第四章到第十章。这一部分专门讨论我认为是最重要的一组终极原因。第四章概述了粮食生产——即通过农业种植和畜牧来生产食物，而不是靠狩猎和采集野生食物——是如何最终产生了使皮萨罗取得胜利的直接因素。但是粮食生产的出现情况在全世界是不同的。我们将要在第五章看到，世界上某些地区的民族靠自己来发展粮食生产；另一些族群在史前期从这些独立的粮食生产中心学会了粮食生产；还有一些族群在史前期既不发展粮食生产也不从别处学会粮食生产，而是直到现在仍然过着狩猎采集生活。第六章研究了只是在某些地区促使狩猎采集的生活方式向粮食生产转变的诸多因素。
Chapters 7, 8, and 9 then show how crops and livestock came in prehistoric times to be domesticated from ancestral wild plants and animals, by incipient farmers and herders who could have had no vision of the outcome. Geographic differences in the local suites of wild plants and animals available for domestication go a long way toward explaining why only a few areas became independent centers of food production, and why it arose earlier in some of those areas than in others. From those few centers of origin, food production spread much more rapidly to some areas than to others. A major factor contributing to those differing rates of spread turns out to have been the orientation of the continents' axes: predominantly west-east for Eurasia, predominantly north-south for the Americas and Africa (Chapter 10).
接着，第七、八、九章说明在史前时代农作物和牲畜是如何从原来的野生植物和动物经过驯化而来的，而做这种驯化工作的早期农民和牧人连做梦也没有想到会有这样的结果。可以用作驯化的当地一批批动植物在地理上的差异，有助于说明为什么只有几个地区成为独立的粮食生产中心，为什么粮食生产在某些地区比在另一些地区出现得早。从原来的这几个中心，粮食生产向某些地区的传播比向另一些地区的传播要迅速得多。造成粮食生产传播速度差异的一个重大因素原来竟是大陆的轴线方向：欧亚大陆主要是东西向，而美洲和非洲则主要是南北向(第十章)。
Thus, Chapter 3 sketched the immediate factors behind Europe's conquest of Native Americans, and Chapter 4 the development of those factors from the ultimate cause of food production. In Part 3 (“From Food to Guns, Germs, and Steel,” Chapters 11–14), the connections from ultimate to proximate causes are traced in detail, beginning with the evolution of germs characteristic of dense human populations (Chapter 11). Far more Native Americans and other non-Eurasian peoples were killed by Eurasian germs than by Eurasian guns or steel weapons. Conversely, few or no distinctive lethal germs awaited would-be European conquerors in the New World. Why was the germ exchange so unequal? Here, the results of recent molecular biological studies are illuminating in linking germs to the rise of food production, in Eurasia much more than in the Americas.
因此，第三章概述了欧洲征服美洲印第安人的直接因素，第四章则概述了这些因素从粮食生产这个终极原因发展而来。第三部分(《从粮食生产到枪炮、病菌与钢铁》，第十一章到第十四章)从密集人口所特有的病菌的演化开始，对从终极原因到近似原因的联系进行了考察(第十一章)。欧亚大陆的病菌杀死的印第安人和其他非欧亚大陆民族，比欧亚大陆的枪炮或钢铁武器所杀死的要多得多。相反，在新大陆，很少有或根本没有任何危险的病菌在等待未来的欧洲征服者。为什么病菌的交流这样不相等？在这里，近来分子生物学的研究成果在把病菌和粮食生产的出现相联系方面是富于启发性的，而这两者的联系在欧亚大陆要远远超过美洲。
Another chain of causation led from food production to writing, possibly the most important single invention of the last few thousand years (Chapter 12). Writing has evolved de novo only a few times in human history, in areas that had been the earliest sites of the rise of food production in their respective regions. All other societies that have become literate did so by the diffusion of writing systems or of the idea of writing from one of those few primary centers. Hence, for the student of world history, the phenomenon of writing is particularly useful for exploring another important constellation of causes: geography's effect on the ease with which ideas and inventions spread.
另一条因果链是从粮食生产到文字，文字可能是过去几千年中最重要的一项发明(第十二章)。在人类历史上，文字只经历过少数几次进化，而发明文字的地区又是各自区域中粮食生产出现最早的地方。所有其他有文字的社会也都经历了同样的进化，或者是由于文字的传播，或者是由于文化的传播，而这种文化又是来自最初的少数几个中心之一。因此，对于研究世界史的人来说，文字这一现象对研究另一组重要的因果关系尤其有用，即地理对思想和发明的传播的方便程度所具有的影响。
What holds for writing also holds for technology (Chapter 13). A crucial question is whether technological innovation is so dependent on rare inventor-geniuses, and on many idiosyncratic cultural factors, as to defy an understanding of world patterns. In fact, we shall see that, paradoxically, this large number of cultural factors makes it easier, not harder, to understand world patterns of technology. By enabling farmers to generate food surpluses, food production permitted farming societies to support full-time craft specialists who did not grow their own food and who developed technologies.
适用于文字的情况也适用于技术(第十三章)。一个关键的问题是：技术创新是不是完全依赖于少数发明家——天才，依赖于许多具有特质的文化因素，以致不可能去了解技术的世界模式。事实上，我们将会看到，奇怪的是，大量的这类文化因素使了解技术的世界模式变得更容易了，而不是变得更困难了。粮食生产使农民能够生产出多余的粮食，从而使农业社会得以养活专职的从事手工艺的专门人材，因为这些人的工作不是种植他们自己吃的粮食，而是发展技术。
Besides sustaining scribes and inventors, food production also enabled farmers to support politicians (Chapter 14). Mobile bands of hunter-gatherers are relatively egalitarian, and their political sphere is confined to the band's own territory and to shifting alliances with neighboring bands. With the rise of dense, sedentary, food-producing populations came the rise of chiefs, kings, and bureaucrats. Such bureaucracies were essential not only to governing large and populous domains but also to maintaining standing armies, sending out fleets of exploration, and organizing wars of conquest.
除了养活抄写员和发明家外，粮食生产还使农民能够养活政治家(第十四章)。以狩猎和采集为生的流动人群相对而言都是平等主义者，他们的政治活动范围局限于自己的地区以及改变与邻近人群的结盟关系。随着稠密的、定居的、从事粮食生产的人口的出现，酋长、国王和官员也出现了。这种行政体系不但对管理幅员广阔、人口众多的领地是至关重要的，而且对维持常备军、派遣探险舰队和组织征服战争也是至关重要的。
Part 4 (“Around the World in Five Chapters,” Chapters 15–19) applies the lessons of Parts 2 and 3 to each of the continents and some important islands. Chapter 15 examines the history of Australia itself, and of the large island of New Guinea, formerly joined to Australia in a single continent. The case of Australia, home to the recent human societies with the simplest technologies, and the sole continent where food production did not develop indigenously, poses a critical test of theories about intercontinental differences in human societies. We shall see why Aboriginal Australians remained hunter-gatherers, even while most peoples of neighboring New Guinea became food producers.
第四部分(《在5章中环游世界》，第十五章至第十九章)把第二部分和第三部分所讲的内容应用于每个大陆和一些重要的岛屿。第十五章研究了澳大利亚本身的历史，以及原来和澳大利亚相连、属于同一大陆的新几内亚这个大岛的历史。澳大利亚是近代技术最简陋的人类社会的所在地，也是其自身没有发展粮食生产的唯一大陆。澳大利亚的情况是对关于人类社会的洲际差异理论的一次决定性检验。我们将会看到，甚至在邻近的新几内亚的大多数族群成了粮食生产者的时候，为什么澳大利亚的土著却仍然以狩猎采集为生。
Chapters 16 and 17 integrate developments in Australia and New Guinea into the perspective of the whole region encompassing the East Asian mainland and Pacific islands. The rise of food production in China spawned several great prehistoric movements of human populations, or of cultural traits, or of both. One of those movements, within China itself, created the political and cultural phenomenon of China as we know it today. Another resulted in a replacement, throughout almost the whole of tropical Southeast Asia, of indigenous hunter-gatherers by farmers of ultimately South Chinese origin. Still another, the Austronesian expansion, similarly replaced the indigenous hunter-gatherers of the Philippines and Indonesia and spread out to the most remote islands of Polynesia, but was unable to colonize Australia and most of New Guinea. To the student of world history, all those collisions among East Asian and Pacific peoples are doubly important: they formed the countries where one-third of the modern world's population lives, and in which economic power is increasingly becoming concentrated; and they furnish especially clear models for understanding the histories of peoples elsewhere in the world.
第十六章和第十七章把澳大利亚和新几内亚的发展结合成整个地区的一幅画面，这个地区包括东亚大陆和太平洋诸岛。中国粮食生产的出现，引起了史前期的人口或文化特征的几次大迁移，或两者的同时迁移。其中有一次迁移发生在中国本土，造成了我们今天所知道的中国这个政治和文化现象。另一次迁移在几乎整个热带东南亚地区导致了最后来自中国南部的中国农民取代了以狩猎采集为生的本地人。还有一次迁移是南岛人[3]
的扩张，这次迁移同样取代了菲律宾和印度尼西亚的以狩猎采集为生的本地人，并扩大到最遥远的波利尼西亚诸岛，但未能在澳大利亚和新几内亚大部分地区殖民。对研究世界史的人来说，东亚和太平洋各民族之间发生的所有这些冲突具有双重的重要性：这些冲突形成了现代世界三分之一人口生存的国家，在这些国家中，经济权力正日益集中；这些冲突还为了解世界其他地方一些民族的历史提供了特别清晰的模式。
Chapter 18 returns to the problem introduced in Chapter 3, the collision between European and Native American peoples. A summary of the last 13,000 years of New World and western Eurasian history makes clear how Europe's conquest of the Americas was merely the culmination of two long and mostly separate historical trajectories. The differences between those trajectories were stamped by continental differences in domesticable plants and animals, germs, times of settlement, orientation of continental axes, and ecological barriers.
第十八章又回到第三章里提出的问题，即欧洲民族和美洲印第安人之间的冲突。总结一下新大陆和欧亚大陆西部地区过去13000年的历史，可以弄清楚欧洲对美洲的征服只不过是两条漫长的通常互不相干的历史轨迹的顶点。这两条轨迹的差异表现在这两个大陆在可驯化的动植物、病菌、定居年代、大陆轴线走向以及生态障碍方面的差异。
Finally, the history of sub-Saharan Africa (Chapter 19) offers striking similarities as well as contrasts with New World history. The same factors that molded Europeans' encounters with Africans molded their encounters with Native Americans as well. But Africa also differed from the Americas in all these factors. As a result, European conquest did not create widespread or lasting European settlement of sub-Saharan Africa, except in the far south. Of more lasting significance was a large-scale population shift within Africa itself, the Bantu expansion. It proves to have been triggered by many of the same causes that played themselves out at Cajamarca, in East Asia, on Pacific islands, and in Australia and New Guinea.
最后，非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区的历史(第十九章)与新大陆的历史不但存在着悬殊的差异，而且也具有显著的相似之处。造成欧洲人与非洲人的冲突的那些因素，同样造成了欧洲人与印第安人的冲突。结果，欧洲人的征服并没有在非洲撒哈拉沙漠以南地区建立大片的或长期的殖民地，只有非洲的南端是例外。具有更持久意义的是非洲内部大规模的人口转移，即班图人的扩张。这都是由许多同样的原因引发的，也就是在卡哈马卡、在东亚、在太平洋诸岛以及在澳大利亚和新几内亚自始至终都在发生作用的那些原因。
I harbor no illusions that these chapters have succeeded in explaining the histories of all the continents for the past 13,000 years. Obviously, that would be impossible to accomplish in a single book even if we did understand all the answers, which we don't. At best, this book identifies several constellations of environmental factors that I believe provide a large part of the answer to Yali's question. Recognition of those factors emphasizes the unexplained residue, whose understanding will be a task for the future.
我不抱任何幻想，以为本书已成功地说明了各大洲过去13000年的历史。显然，要想在一本书里做到这一点是不可能的，即使我们真正地了解所有这些答案，我们也不可能做到，何况我们并不了解呢。至多，本书确定了几组环境因素，我认为这些因素提供了对耶利的问题的大部分答案。承认这些因素也就是突出了原因不明的剩下来的几个问题，而了解这些问题则是将来要做的事。
The Epilogue, entitled “The Future of Human History as a Science,” lays out some pieces of the residue, including the problem of the differences between different parts of Eurasia, the role of cultural factors unrelated to environment, and the role of individuals. Perhaps the biggest of these unsolved problems is to establish human history as a historical science, on a par with recognized historical sciences such as evolutionary biology, geology, and climatology. The study of human history does pose real difficulties, but those recognized historical sciences encounter some of the same challenges. Hence the methods developed in some of these other fields may also prove useful in the field of human history.
后记题为《人类史作为一门科学的未来》，列出了剩下来的几个问题，包括欧亚大陆不同地区之间的差异问题，与环境无关的文化因素的作用，以及个人的作用。也许，这些未解决的问题中最大问题是确立人类史作为一门历史科学的地位，就像演化生物学、地质学和气候学这类已经得到承认的历史科学一样。对人类历史的研究的确会碰到一些真正的困难，但这些已经得到承认的历史科学也碰到一些同样的挑战。因此，在这些不同领域中发展起来的方法在人类史这个领域中也可能证明是有用的。
Already, though, I hope to have convinced you, the reader, that history is not “just one damn fact after another,” as a cynic put it. There really are broad patterns to history, and the search for their explanation is as productive as it is fascinating.
然而，我希望我已经使读者相信，历史并不“就是一个又一个讨厌的事实”，就像一个愤世嫉俗者说的那样。的确存在着适用于历史的广泛模式，而寻找对这些模式的解释不但令人陶醉，也是大有裨益的。
注释：
1 新月沃地或称肥沃新月地带：指西亚伊拉克两河流域连接叙利亚一带地中海东岸的一片弧形地区，因土地肥沃，形如新月，故名；为上古文明发源地之一。——译者
2 阿诺德·约瑟夫·汤因比(Toynbee，Arnold，1899—1975)：英国历史学家，经济学家A·汤因比之侄，曾任伦敦大学国际历史研究教授，伦敦国际事务学会研究部主任(1925—1955)，主要著作《历史研究》发展了德国O·施彭格勒的文化形态史观。——译者
3 南岛人(Austronesians)一词的翻译来自“南岛语”(Austronesianlanguages)一词，南岛人就是说南岛语的人。根据本书的介绍，南岛人源自中国华南，他们经由台湾到菲律宾和印度尼西亚群岛，继而向太平洋诸岛扩张。——译者